Episode 2 - Gela (part 2) 🇬🇧

Hello everybody and welcome to this new episode of ‘Tales from the Hideout’. I am, as always, Nicola, and I will recount for you the stories of the British agents in Italy during the Second World War. Today’s episode doesn't need a lengthy introduction. It will pick up things were we left off. Brietsche, chief of the Gela mission, has escaped, with what’s left of the mission, the great rastrellamento of the Grappa at the end of September 1944. He’s now in the Casiglio woods, where he met Major Tilman, who was visiting the headquarters of the partisan division Nannetti.

Therefore, to avoid building up too much suspense, I’d say we can start.

At this point, Brietsche didn’t want to hear about the partisans anymore.

He thought that they were cowards, useless, not brave enough to face war’s risks.

The mission, at this point, was reduced to only four members: Captain Brietsche himself, Corporal Ball, Norton (one of the two soldiers, former pow who had joined the mission) and the interpreter, Mr Palmer. Palmer asked and received permission to be exfiltrated through Yugoslavia and go back to Southern Italy. Brietsche, essentially, wanted to do the same, ending the mission with a complete failure.

He explained his complaints to Tillman, telling him he wanted to leave the mission and asking him to be led to Yugoslavia in order to go back to the south.

Tillman, anyway, proposed him an alternative plan: give a second chance to the partisans.

The Nannetti, indeed, lacked a Liaison Officer and Tillman was there to fix this.

The arrival of Mission “Gela” was like “killing two birds with one stone”.

Tillman proposed to Brietsche to look after the Nannetti, lead them on the right side of the Piave river and entrench there in order to pass the winter.

On paper, the Nannetti’s situation was way worse than the one of the group on the Grappa, already seen by Brietsche at his arrival.

The partisans had few weapons: most of the equipment was lost the previous month, after the enemies did a rastrellamento. In addition, their clothes were very shabby.

Moreover, the Nannetti’s formation was entirely communist, at least on paper, and this pout its reliability, both politically and militarily into question. Anyway, after spending few days with them, Brietsche was very impressed by their sense of community and their moral; they were always positive, despite the sacrifices and the difficulties. On November 1st, “Gela” mission was officially assigned to the Nannetti division as a Liaison Mission.

On November 14th, Brietsche’s sensations were confirmed: the partisans were attacked from the Germans through the alps, managing to survive in the end. In particular, the Manara battalion fought without any sign of retreat. On a total number of 28 men, 11 were killed in action, including their commander and his vice commander.

However, I must specify here that there is an incongruity in Brietsche’s tale. According to Italian sources, in fact, it was ‘Vitas’ of the Cacciatori delle Alpi who repelled the attack and he did not die. It’s unclear what created this confusion. Maybe Brietsche is simply misremembering the events, considering the fact that he did not speak Italian very well apparently. However, it is important to point out these issues, as they remind us of the fact that seeing things through the eyes of the agents can unearth new facets of the Resistance we might not know, but it might also create some confusion. Anyways, regardless of how things went, regardless of whether the partisan commander died or not, this action was a turning point for Brietsche. As he noted in his report, this was the moment when he decided to help the partisans enthusiastically. As he wrote, this was the moment when he realised he was dealing with a ‘different stock’ of partisans.

Despite many good premises, the following period was very hard. While the mission and the partisans were waiting for supplies which never arrived, their munitions and food were about to finish. One night, by chance, they saw their supplies being airdropped by mistake on German’s light signals, which had been lighted up in order to confuse the pilots.

On the mountains the snow started to fall and the whole battalion was particularly struggling because of the very heavy snow on the path. Since the circumstances seemed to be very bad, the partisans and the British decided to wait for better conditions.

On November 22nd, finally a good news arrived: Nicholson sent Captain Richard Tolson in order to help them.

Tolson, by the way, will publish, posthumous, a diary of his time in Italy, titled ‘Diario di guerra 1944-1945.’ If you want to know more about him, you can.

On November 26th the first restock was airdropped to the mission. We can only imagine how happy they were when the supplies arrived.

At this point, the mission grew bigger and counted two more members among war’s former prisoners: Private Black from expeditionary forces of New Zealand and Sergeant Gurka from USA Aviation.

Thanks to the arrival of the supplies, Briestche started to organize the partisans, trying to get more men. He worked together with ‘Milo’, the chief of the Nannetti from Belluno, whose real name was Francesco Pesce (another semi-legendary figure of the Italian resistance). They created two new brigades: the ‘Mazzini’ and the ‘Tollot’, both under the Nannetti’s command.

Here’s another incongruency, as we know that the Mazzini and the Tollot were already existing. The brigades had been simply ‘pianurizzate’, meaning they had left the mountains and dispersed into the plains, because of the autumn rastrellamento. Once more, it’s unclear why Brietsche is mistaken here. Maybe he did not understand, maybe nobody bothered to explain the situation to him, maybe he’s trying to gain points, so to speak, with the Commands, saying that he had instituted two new brigades.

Tolson was left to coordinate the airfield, which should be the one organised by the Nannetti at the basis of the Col di Scios, while Britesche and Milo were trying to lighten the mood among the partisans after their ‘winter coma’.

Brietsche and Milo left the Nannetti’s headquarter and reached the new area in which they decided to do and plan their new activities.

They arrived in that area at the beginning of January, but the situation was not as they expected. The partisans were few, not organized, with few weapons.

While checking the partisan forces, Milo and Brietsche ran into Major Benucci from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the American equivalent of the SOE. He had set a Liaison Mission in that area, with the ‘Settima Alpini’ brigade, made by former Alpini. The relationship between the Garibaldini and the Alpini was not good, nor was the one between American and British forces.

Benucci had promised new supplies to Tillman, before he left the Nannetti: those supplies never arrived. In addition, Benucci was randomly ammassing supplies, for this reason his men wore American or British uniforms; they were fully clothed, well fed, with good weapons. The communists, instead, had shabby clothes and were forced to eat just polenta or chestnut flour.

Brietsche, anyway, always the optimist (we must give this to him), was convinced that their bad condition would have been better soon. Together with Milo, he met Benucci in order to plan an even partition of the supplies; anyway, they didn’t reach any result. In addition, Brietsche met a very strange person in a tavern in the village of S. Antonio: Major Chappel from the OSS. After few drinks, and here, once more, Brietsche’s report is incomplete as he does not say if they were drinking wine or grappa, the American man told his story to Brietsche: he should have been in Austria, but Major Benucci decided to keep him in that area, as the liaison officer of the Settima Alpini. The brigade had very good weapons, for this reason Chappel accepted that proposal with goodwill. Anyway, about a hundred of German men attacked them. Even though that German brigade was made by old men and very young boys, the Alpini ran away without fighting, abandoning their weapons and supplies. Chappel himself escaped by miracle. From that moment on, Chappel didn’t want to go back to Benucci and decided to hide in that tavern, in which he met Brietsche.

In that moment, Brietsche thought that was a good idea to propose him to become the new Liaison Officer of the Mazzini and the Tollot brigades. After refusing for a while, Chappel finally accepted that proposal.

While things were partially set, Milo and Brietsche decided to start again their trip, but they couldn’t leave the place until February 12 because of continuous snowfalls. At the same time, Bruno, Paride Brunetti (who escaped many rastrellamenti in the Grappa area) became the commander of the Mazzini brigade and started a series of incursions against the enemies, placing mines on many bridges. Milo was working really hard to organize the partisans and make a true fighting force out of them. It must be noted that Brietsche in his report is always very supportive of Milo: he praises Milo’s behaviour, and also his attitude to leadership. Thing were not good for Tolson, however, whose forces had to retire deep into the Cansiglio woods after the enemies attached.

Brietsche asked for an urgent airdrop of supplies for Tolson; those supplies arrived, together with a new radio kit. The arrival of that supplies stated the beginning of the ‘Gela Blue’ mission. In that period, Brietsche helped also the evacuation of nine American aviators. Benucci tried before, but he failed. One of them, lieutenant Berry, decided to stay with the mission.

In the end, on February 15 1945, Milo an Brietsche managed to go back to Tolson in the Cansiglio area. The partisans were nervous, the enemy was shelling their positions with artillery. However, at the moment airdrops were more regular and the partisans could enlarge their equipment. The first to test it were the men of the Garibaldini groups ‘Vittorio Veneto’, which was a group of brigades under the command of the Nannetti division. The ‘Ciro Menotti’ brigade pushed back a rastrellamento in their area. The ‘Cacciatori delle Alpi’ started to attack the enemies’ communication lines. The ‘Fratelli Bandiera’ brigade met the enemy in the Alpago, managing to capture a mortar. The ‘Mazzini’ and the ‘Tollot’ brigades, instead, were suffering the enemies’ attacks. Chappell was arrested, escaping a few days later. Anyway, the radio kit got lost.

At that point, they received the news of a new offensive by the Allies coming from the south. The mission and the partisans decided to raise the bar on the fight. The Vittorio Veneto brigades, commanded by Pagnocca and Bianco and directed by Milo (on this point Brietsche is firm: the actual commander is always Milo), defeated the Germans in the Cansiglio. The reprisal column sent by the enemy was destroyed in an ambush. The partisans entrenched themselves; they positioned mines and booby-traps while sending parties to attack nearby areas. The Germans tried to attack the ‘Ciro Menotti’ brigade, but their commander blew himself on a mine with two lieutenants; for this reason, the mood of the troops plummeted. The enemies tried to bribe the partisans but failed to do so and resolved to camp many troops very close to the partisans’ positions, without attacking them. During the night, the ‘Cacciatori delle Alpi’ attacked the Germans, routing them. At that point, the Germans decided to bomb the partisans from afar, using the artillery, but the partisans were prepared, hided in shelters. In addition, during the night they managed to slip behind the enemies’ lines, sabotaging and stealing materials. The mission was also reinforced after many sabotage instructors were sent to their area.

Military problems were, finally, finding their solution. However, new troubles arose when Maj. Tillman asked Capt. Brietsche to remove Milo and replace him with Pagnocca as the division commander. The reason was that Milo, as a Communist, was considered too intransigent by the Commands. Moreover, Maj. Tillman wanted to split the division making the Tollot and Mazzini independent. Brietsche could not wrap his head around these decisions. He had no faith in Pagnocca, who had been put in a position of command while Tolson was away and did not inspired the men like Milo, nor he had showed the same attitude as a military leader, or the same determination. Moreover, Brietsche did not want to disorganise the division, since it was fighting so well at the moment, breaking the chain of command with the Mazzini and the Tollot. He put no trust in the Zone Commander, Maj. Abba, nor in Tillman’s interpreter, Gatti. Therefore, at the following meeting with Tilman, Brietsche stood his ground: he informed the Major that, if Milo were to be removed and the Nannetti partitioned, he would leave the mission entirely. Tilman, who maybe was thinking the same and was probably simply referring orders form the Commands, accepted this position and put aside the project.

During the night of the 17 March 1945 Captain Lingen was dropped, to replace Brietsche. However, the events prevented the substitution until the 21 April (essentially, the end of the war). The partisans, in fact, were harassing the retreating German troops without quartier, and final victory appeared at hand. On the 27 April, the last pockets of enemy resistance were assaulted by the Nannetti partisans. The Ciro Menotti liberated the village of Sacile, the Cacciatori delle Alpi the area between Ogliano and Conegliano, the Cairoli entered Vittorio Veneto and the surrounding villages. The partisans took also control of the 28 hydroelectric plants of the area, preventing the Germans from employing scorch land tactics.

The preservation of important installations, considered vital for the Italian industrial and civil life, was a key function of the partisan bands during the German withdrawal. And the missions were invested of vast responsibilities to make sure that the partisans defended these installations. The Allied wanted to avoid, beside the economic damages caused by the destruction of large industrial sites, civil unrest that could spark if, for example, cities were to remain without electricity for a prolonged period of time. In general, the Commands were more than satisfied with the results attained by the partisans in this task.

Unfortunately, some of these plants were bombed by the RAF, causing the pointless death of seven partisans (half of the losses in this final phase of the conflict) and widespread indignation. This indignation is echoed by the missions as well, in their telegrams to the Commands. These kind of events happened not only in Veneto but also, for example, in Piedmont. The SOE Commands, on the other hand, found impossible to explain these completely nonsensical attacks against liberated objectives. When they wrote to the RAF to request explanations, in fact, they simply did not get any answer.

On the 30 April Lingen established his Headquarters in Vittorio Veneto and contacted the Allied Military Government, the organisation in charge of liberated areas. Tension grew a lot as Colonel Wilkinson (not ‘Freccia’, a Colonel Wilkinson belonging to the AMG), asked the immediate disarmament of the Nannetti partisans and Milo instead ordered his men to keep their weapons. The problem of weapons, the problem of disarmament, is one of the big issues the British had to face in Italy. Partisans, in fact, wanted to keep their arms, for a variety of reasons. First, they are afraid that Fascism might return, or they fear private vendettas by Fascists. Some wanted to prepare for a revolution, others wanted to take justice in their own hands.

Lingen decided to contact Colonel Price, another member of the AMG, bypassing Wilkinson, and they decided to hold a celebratory parade for the partisans and the mission, at the end of which arms would be relinquished. This technique had been already used with success in Emilia-Romagna, for example, as, in the end, the partisans were attached to their weapons and wanted to keep them for a variety of reasons, but were also very sensitive to these kind of recognition from the Allies. Many of them considered themselves, rightfully, as part of the Allied forces who freed the country. In an euphoric climate, thus, the partisans paraded on the 14 May. However, many of them were allowed to remain armed in the end, to act as police in the area. Some 1500 partisans kept their weapons which had surely acquired a symbolic and affective value by this point.

We have now reached the end of the Gela’s tale. Gela appears to be a very particular mission, if not by the fact that all liaison missions to Italy are particular, for one reason or another. Gela is split into two parts by this great event, almost a cataclysm, the rastrellamento of the Grappa. A critical event for the Resistance in Veneto but also for the life of the mission and its components. Brietsche comes out as a changed man, and his relationship with the partisans is an interesting evolution. As he arrived, he did not seem to have any particular opinion of them, either positive or negative. After the Grappa he is done with them. At the end of his period in Italy, he’ll become their paladin. We can surely say that Brietsche learned something on the partisans and maybe even on himself, during his experience as a guerrigliero.

We can also make some general considerations from the story of Gela. First: agents lived the partisan war in full. They were in no way privileged and shared with their partisans the cold, hunger, privations and death. It’s noteworthy the fury with which Brietsche protests the lack of airdropped supplies not only in his final report but also in various telegrams during the autumn-winter of 1944. He’s not shy on criticising the RAF and even the central Commands. In fact, upon closer inspection, the identification between the mission and the partisans is so deep, that many of Brietsche’s messages could have been written by any partisan leader.

Missions and partisans, thus, are on the same boat and political considerations, such as the diffidence towards the Communists, are put aside very soon as a result. Brietesche is at home with the Nannetti and Milo and we can suppose that the two were, if not friends, at least on good terms by the end of the mission. And we’ll see that this anti-Communist sentiment stopped often in London. Tilman himself was working with Communists and does not seem to have push too much to remove Milo, which lets us speculate on the fact he was simply passing down orders from his superior officers.

It is all the more unfortunate, thus, on the ground of this tale and of the good relationship built, factitiously, on the field between British and Italians, that the memory of the missions has all but disappeared. Unfortunately, and this is common as far as the biography of the agents go, we don’t know if Brietsche ever came back to the places where he fought with his mission. We know that some agents did, because of friendships, or nostalgic or affective ties they had with those places. However, of many agents, we know virtually nothing of their lives after the mission, and thus we don’t know how they related to their experience in Italy. An issue that underlines, once more, the gap in the Italian and British memory of this bizarre cooperation.

I hope you found this first tale enjoyable and perhaps even interesting, and I will see you in the next episode, where we’ll recount the tale of mission ‘Incisor’. The mission was parachuted very late, on the 6 April 1945, destination Valle d’Aosta. Thus, this mission had, on paper, a very simple task: protect the hydroelectric plants of the Valle d’Aosta for about three weeks. However, it found itself entangled in much bigger problems.