Episode 3 - Incisor 🇬🇧

Hello and welcome to this new episode of 'Tales from the Hideout'. Today we'll talk about another mission, the 'Incisor' that was a sub-mission of the large Piedmontese 'Cherokee' mission. The Cherokee was this large mission that coordinated many other sub-missions, including, as I was saying, the Incisor, originally called 'Clarinda II'. The mission was active in the Aosta Valley starting from the 6 April 1945. Apparently, it was a simple mission. If for no other reason that the time window is very short. In fact, from the 6 to the 25 April, the timeframe is only a few weeks. Obviously, the Allies did not know exactly when the war in Italy would end. However, on the 6 April it was clear that the Germans were retreating and that the Allied advance would reach, at least, the Alps. This mission, thus, was parachuted, unlike for example the Gela, not to coordinate large partisan bands to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Germans, but rather with the more modest objective of protecting some plants considered to be pivotal for the Italian industrial production from Germans attempts to put scorch earth tactics into action. It was, thus, as the British dubbed it and 'anti-scorch' operation.

However, this mission was entangled in a very different situation, which fell outside the scope of a typical mission or, at least, outside the scope one would imagine for missions of this type.

The Incisor mission, destined to the Aosta Valley, was parachuted in the night of the 6 April 1945 in Piedmont, and received by the Cherokee mission, lead by Major Readhead. The mission's members were originally three: Major Morton, known as 'Smith', Sergeant Williams and Sergeant Lloyd, known as 'Catania' and they landed without problems. Of these three, unlike others, we know very little. The only one we know something about is Major George Morton, who at the time was possibly still a Captain, the report is unclear on this. Morton was a former SOE instructor that was sent to Italy to 'get his hands dirty', of the other two we know nothing at all. Three days later, on the 9 April, the mission was reinforced by another personnel drop. This included another three officers: Adam, Oglietti (maybe known as Mezard, or maybe his name was Mezard and was known as Oglietti) and Picchio. All of them were likely Italians, all of them had probably previous ties with the Valdostan Resistance, and all of them were probably using pseudonims. The three did not have any experience in parachuting and the landing was rough. Adam hurt his chest, Oglietti broke his ankle and Picchio twisted his knee; therefore more than half of the dropped personnel was immediately put out of order. That same night, the mission received Mr 'Renati', Annibale Canepari, political commissioner of the Aosta Valley. The commissar brought bad news: the local zone commander, Edoardo Page (Ardes) had given the order to arrest Adam. Evidently, there were some frictions in the Valdostan Resistance, that, however, we do not know, as Morton did not know them and he never learnt them, so they are missing in the report. Morton says he proposed to Renati to get rid of Ardes, but the details of his proposal are not mentioned and it appears that Renati strongly rejected it.

On the 11 April, the mission left to reach the Aosta Valley, leaving Picchio and Oglietti behind, as the two, obviously, were not able to travel in their conditions. The mission's journey is not easy to follow. Morton in his report is very brief and, moreover, it seems he made many spelling mistakes when it came to the names of the villages and the mountains they traversed. We know that the group reached the village of Marine, a part of the town of Perloz, in the South-eastern part of the Valley after a seven-hours climb and spent the night there. The next day they were forced to stop again, as Catania was suffering from an inflammation, most likely because the march had been very arduous. This time they stopped at Echallogne. Morton sent word to the other mission in the area 'Clarinda' lead by Major McKenna, and to Renati and Ardes, to organise a meeting and clarify things. However, only the latter was able to come, as the other two were instead delayed. Ardes greeted them in a friendly manner and reassured Morton he had no reason to be hostile to Adam anymore. Evidently, the problem had been solved by the Italians among themselves, and they had no intention to tell Morton the reason why they quarrelled, nor how they resolved the quarrel. Ardes than complained about the involvement of the USSR and France in the war, which made a really bad impression on Morton. He started to think that Ardes was a man who talked, and above all complained, a lot, but of little 'substance' so to speak. In private, Morton proposed to Adam to replace him as a zone commander, but Adam refused. He confirmed that he trusted Ardes and pointed out that the partisan leader was loved by his men, thus replacing him would most likely cause a disintegration of the bands.

On the 16 April, the mission held a meeting with various leaders of the local Resistance, to coordinate their action. Time was of the essence, as they all knew that Liberation was approaching. During this meeting Ardes was confirmed as zone commander and Adam, together with the garibaldino 'Barbaro' (evidently a psudonym, but Morton does not report his real name) were appointed vice-commanders. Morton reports that he personally supported Barbaro because of his young age, as he was barely twenty years old, thinking that, since Adam was older and more experienced, he would be de facto, the sole vice-commander. The next day the mission established its HQ in the village of Brusson. On the same day, Colonel Brun arrived from Turin, bringing orders from Colonel Stevens. Stevens was the chief of a mission that managed many other missions in Western Piedmont. The orders were to divide the region into two operative zones: one from the French border and the village of Ponte San Martino, Pont-saint-Martin, and the second one from this village to Clauso, in Piedmont. It is evident, here, that the British did not follow the territorial divisions of the Italian regions, as the first operative zone included almost all of the Aosta Valley. Ponte San Martino, in fact, is on the border between this region and Piedmont and sits at the South-eastern entrance of the Valley. It was decided that Adam would be in control of this first operative zone (meaning of all of the Aosta Valley, essentially), but it is unclear if this was ever implemented, given the fact that Adam himself had declined command before.

On the 20 April, the mission held a new meeting to coordinate anti-scorch operation, all those operations to protect roads, railways, industrial implants... from the Germans in case they attempted to employ scorch-earth tactics during their withdrawal to make things more difficult for the advancing Allied armies. In particular, the Aosta Valley was considered to be pivotal in these operations, as there are still today, just like at the time, many hydroelectric plants which provided electricity to Piedmont and Lombardy. There were some difficulties: the bands and the SAP, (the Squadre di Azione Patriottica), who were active in Aosta, and acted in small groups to carry what we now would call terrorism in towns and cities, were quarrelling on the distribution of weapons. In the end, however, a plan of action was agreed upon. Two days later, finally, McKenna met Morton in Valtournenche. Here, Morton was informed that Adam was negotiating with the German troops in Aosta for their surrender. The Germans, numbering roughly 1300 men, asked to go to Switzerland undisturbed, in exchange they were offering to give the partisans all of their weapons, destroy their artillery and neutralise the local Fascist Brigata Nera, which included also a detachment of the Folgore. As a guarantee, the German commander, Colonel Staunter, offered himself as an hostage, saying he would remain in custody in Valtournenche. Both Adam and Ardes were willing to agree to these terms and now were asking the permission from the mission. Morton refused to agree, saying that his orders prevented him from accepting anything else than the unconditional surrender of the Germans. However, he also pointed out that he, technically, had no authority on the partisans, as his role was purely advisory. Therefore, he could not forbid them from reaching an agreement with the Germans. The two subsequentially accepted the German offer.

Further negotiations were conducted by the mission with the local Alpini division. The alpini quickly accepted to join forces with the partisans, lightening the burden of protecting the hydroelectric plants, as those troops were garrisoning many of them. At this point, in the Aosta Valley, only 900 Italian soldiers (500 Folgore and 400 Brigata Nera) and a few more German troops remained active, as garrisons in Aosta and in a few villages. The partisans were eager to launch an all-out attack but Morton was not convinced that the Italians would be able to get rid of the enemy. However, more good news arrived: the German troops that were not under Staunter's control were Ukrainian, therefore their morale was supposed to be very low and their willingness to fight almost non-existent. Therefore, Morton gave his consent for a general attack for the 26 April.

The following days were spent in feverish preparations, as you can expect. Adam sent, on the 25 April, commander 'Tito' and his men to Aosta, leaving Valtournenche undefended. Morton had to call Tito back, to avoid leaving a whole in the partisans' formation. Here, maybe, we have a confirmation of the Fact that Adam was right in declining the position of zone commander, as he does not seem to be particularly well-versed in tactics. The partisans obeyed orderly but also protested vehemently with the British officer, pointing out that receiving contraddictory orders was sub-optimal, especially in such a delicate situation. However, it was not a complete blunder: on their way back, Tito and his men intercepted a German officer who confirmed that he had received orders from the Commands to evacuate the German troops from the Valley on the 28.

The attack thus begun at dawn on the 26 April, however, difficulties soon surfaced. Aosta had been encircled by partisan forces but it looked like the Germans had gone back on their word. Apparently, colonel Staunter had not been cautious enough, probably because of the rather dangerous situation he was in, and was almost discovered by his superiors. He had been ordered to send the Folgore men to Turin, however, since he had promised to surrender all Italian troops to the partisans, he tried to buy time to keep the brigade in Aosta. This made the Commands suspicious and they sent an officer to check things out. Staunter panicked, cut all communications with the partisans and move with his troops to the village of St. Vincent. During the night a group of twelve Germans wearing civilian clothes were intercepted by Tito's men while they were marching towards a nearby hydroelectrical plant. Morton does not dwell on their fate, but it is probable that they were executed on the spot. The partisans, meanwhile, had been able to enter Ponte San Martino, but were expelled from it the following day by a German counter-attack. Aosta, defended only by Italian troops, as the Germans were in St. Vincent, was liberated on the 28 April, the partisans marched into the city with the CLN and the mission in tow and captured the whole garrison. Finally, after a few days of tension, the Germans capitulated on the 2 May. Colonel Staunter kept his word regarding scorch earth tactics in the Valley. However, in the Eastern part of the Valley, where troops evidently did not respond to him, there were attacks against the plants of Villeneuve and Aymavilles, that were repelled by the alpini who had recently switched sides. Morton also adds that the alpini were instrumental in the demining of various roads in the Valley.

Il looked as the operations had been a resounding success, and that the mission was ready for liquidation after only a few weeks. Parachuted on the 6 April, on the 2 May everything was over, not even a month had passed. However, Morton did not know that this was the moment when things were about to get really complicated.

French troops, in fact, had been sighted on the border. France had, not without good reasons (Italy's entrance in the Second World War, it must be pointed out, had been marked by this cowardly attack, this backstab against France, once it had already been defeated by Nazi Germany). There is, therefore a lot of bad blood and France, as we were saying, had territorial ambitions in Italy. The Aosta Valley, with its francophone population and the presence of many hydroelectric plants is a juicy target. A French envoy, Captain Muscadet met Major Morton in Aosta and announced to him that he had orders to expel the Germans from the Valley. Morton replied that there was no need, as the partisans controlled the area and there were virtually no German troops remaining. Here, we know that Morton is lying, because it was the 28 April, Aosta has been liberated, but there are still doubts about the surrender of Colonel Staunter and his troops. They are entrenched in St. Vincent and no-one knows what is going to happen. However, Mortond decided to answer in this way to the French. Muscadet agreed and accepted to go back to his regiment to report, and Morton was convinced that the situation was under control.

However, on the same evening of the 28 April Morton was called to the Aosta prefettura, where he found the Italians in 'a state of great agitation', as he reports. French troops had crossed the border and were entering the Valley. Ardes claimed that, as far as he was concerned, he would muster their men and take to the mountains, the prefetto and the CLN officers announced their resignation, things were getting heated. Morton tried to cool things down. He stated that he had no news about French troops in the Aosta Valley. Moreover, his orders were clear: he was the only representative of the Allied Command until the arrival of the AMG and he had to cooperate with the prefetto and the CLN to keep peace. Therefore, the French had no authority neither on him, nor on the Italians, thus there was no reason to present hasty resignations that would, in realty, only complicate the matter further. He also asked how the Italians were so sure about those news. The Italians, and in particular Maj. Blanc (who maybe was a member of the CVL but Morton does not say anything about it) produced a letter from a partisan leader who was held in Grenoble. The letter stated that the French were ready to occupy the Valley, install their own pro-French CLN, impose their currency and proclaim a plebiscite for the annexation of the Valley to France. Morton was still unconvinced and warned Ardes that taking arms against the French would make him a rebel, with all the consequences that this would entail. There was some further discussion but eventually, the Italians agreed with Maj. Morton points and the meeting was dismissed. After that, Morton contacted again Muscadet and informed him of his orders and the role of the mission. Muscadet said once more he would refer to his superiors.

On the evening of the 30 April Maj. Morton was summoned again by the zone commander and he found him in the company of three French officers: Major Michelet, Captain Muscadet and Captain Laboret. It sounds like a pounchline, but those were their names. The French wanted to reach the village of Introd (or maybe Indrot, I am not sure of the pronunciation) to quarter two companies. The village, about 15 Km West of Aosta, was situated at the entrance of the Aosta Valley proper. Ardes protested vehemently, claiming that he could not be responsible for the partisans’ actions if such a thing was to happen. Michelet rebuked that the Italian partisans were already nothing more than a nuisance as they hindered the French’s advance in every way possible, short of directly attacking them. He had orders to reach Introd and he was ready to fight to get there. Morton tried to cool down things once more. He managed to convince Ardes to step down and concede. As the matter was settled, Morton had a conversation, alone, with the French officers. Michelet was complained about the Italian behaviour and alleged that those who were hindering him were not Valdostans, but rather Italians. Morton rebuked that he was under the impression that Valdostans were indeed Italians. Michelet then corrected himself saying the was referring to Italian partisans coming from outside of the Valley. Once again, Morton rebuked this argument, as he stated that the partisans in the Valley were almost entirely locals. Michelet stated the partisans were indeed locals, but they acting on the orders they received from the 'Italian' CLN of Turin. Maj. Morton replied that those allegations were simply absurd. The meeting was at an impasse, as we can imagine that Morton was starting to doubt his conviction regarding the good faith of the French, when it was announced that another French officer, the forth one, Colonel de Gelbert, had arrived in Aosta.

Morton thus went to another meeting with Colonel de Gelbert, who seemed to have a better understanding of the situation and of the dangers of the French occupation of the Aosta Valley. De Gelbert claimed he was acting purely on military orders, he wanted to occupy three villages in the Valley (Pre St. Didier, La Thuile and Introd). Moreover, all partisans were to be removed from those areas as well as all non-valdostan partisans moved East of Aosta. Ardes was invited to the meeting and the Italian accepted the French conditions, as reported by Maj. Morton, the atmosphere of this meeting was cordial. The zone command and the French reached a final agreement on the 1 May defining the French zone of occupation. One day before the final surrender of the German troops. However, Morton was, at this point, suspicious of the French and decided to keep an eye on their activities. At least two more incidents reinforced Morton' suspicions towards the French that, at this point, were turning more and more into preoccupation as he had dismissed the Italians' suspects at first.

'Jorrioz', a partisan leader, was approached by Muscadet, who offered him ‘honour and advancement’, as Morton reports, if he would assist the French troops in driving the Italians out of the Valley. Muscadet, however, counted his chickens before they hatched, and Jorrioz promptly wrote to Maj. Morton to denounce this fact. On the 2 May Major Michelet went by car to the lower valley with the intention of going to Turin. He thus discovered that at Ivrea there was still a small German garrison (5000 strong) who had refused to surrender to the partisans. He, therefore, wanted to take 150 French soldiers to demand their surrender to him. In this case, the Italians proved to be well-prepared and anticipated the possible quarrel. Major Blanc offered, kindly, all the motor transport the partisans had and arranged for a special train to carry the French troops. Michelet informed Morton of this ‘with a sneer’ commenting that the partisans were afraid to get into trouble now that they had seen the French soldiers in the Valley. Morton noted that the French attitude revealed that he did not understand what was going on in the Aosta Valley.

Later that evening, word came that the Germans at Ivrea had already surrendered to the British mission Cherokee. As Major Michelet had already departed from Aosta, the zone command decided, in order to respect due procedures, to contact the senior French officer who was still in town, Captain Laboret. Laboret, once informed of the news, gave permission to cancel the train and transport of troops. This caused furious protests by Michelet the next morning. He claimed Laboret never gave permission to cancel the troop transport and demanded to get at least the promised motor transport, if they could not send the train, which Blanc, ever generous, placed at his disposal.

At this point, to ascertain the situation, Morton decided to go to Ivrea. On the 3 May, along the way, he run into Michelet who informed him that the Germans had indeed surrendered to the Cherokee and that he had placed one company of French troops at Ponte San Martino. Morton was deeply disturbed by this development as Ponte San Martin, as we said, was placed at the entry of the Valley for those who came from Piedmont. Therefore, at the moment, mission and partisans alike were in a situation where the French controlled the access to the Aosta Valley. On his return to Aosta, he also noticed a worrying increase in the number of French officers in the town. In the prefettura Morton met Blanc and d’Entreves (who is maybe a member of the CLN, but Morton does not specify it) who were in a state of great depression. They were convinced that the French were gearing up to annex the whole Aosta valley.

The following day, the 4 May, Morton was woken up by a big racket. American forces had been spotted and Morton informed Major Michelet right away. The French officer called for Colonel de Gelbert in a state of excitement, almost panic. De Gelbert stated that American troops should not pass beyond the village of Ponte San Martino and proposed to send Maj. Michelet and Maj. Morton to stop them there. Morton, always accommodating, accepted but stated he had no authority over American troops. However, too much time had been lost in the search for the Colonel and in the organization of Morton and Michelet's trip, and the Americans were already entering Aosta. Their entrance was the most American possible as well, as Morton reported: a procession of jeeps and cars, tanks and lorries paraded the streets, with sirens screaming and soldiers shouting and singing. The noise filled the whole town. Morton noted with pleasure that the view of the American troops had deeply demoralised the French, as he put it ‘they were the picture of despair’. Morton left them alone and met with the American Commander, Major Rooney and reported on the situation.

During the day Morton received reports of French officers and provocateurs spreading pro-French propaganda ad slanderous rumours against the local partisan leaders and the mission. While Maj. Morton had no sure way to prove those activities were the work of the French Commands he took upon himself to report to base to confirm his trust in the partisans, saying they had acted admirably during the time he spent with them and pointing out that any rumours on the local partisans were completely unfounded.

Morton then spent some time in his report on the French and their aims in the Valley. All this activity had in fact convinced Morton that the Italians were right: the French had the intention to occupy the Valley straight away. The liberation of Aosta by the partisans and the presence of the mission, put a dent in this plan and they, therefore, decided to occupy the Valley in various stages. After the first step, the occupation of Ponte San Martino, they were forestalled once more by the Americans. At this point, according to Morton, they switched to propaganda and defamation. Morton reported that a local informant, who we must suppose was reliable if Morton mentions him in his official report, told him about a meeting between French representatives and local partisans where the French openly agitated for rebellion against the British mission.

The mission remained in the Aosta Valley for the whole month of May to look after the disarmament of the partisans. Morton kept an eye on the French activities as well. In this period he diligently collected all rumours he received from his informants. The French committed themselves to a defamatory campaign against the mission and the partisans. They declared, for example, that annexation of the Valley to France had already been agreed by the Allies. Moreover, they tried to spread the rumour that the British and Americans were leeching to their pockets 60% of the Italian industrial production and that the same would surely happen to the Valdostani as well if they did not ask for French protection. Morton reported that those techniques were somewhat effective on the population of the more remote villages. However, when the mission was liquidated, on the 31 May 1945, he was optimistic that the Valdostani would not renounce their ties with the rest of the Italians.

We reached, thus, the end of another tale. And, just like last time, today as well we can draw some general conclusions from the experience of mission Incisor and Major Morton. First, obviously, this mission, if compared with the previous one, shows the great variety of tasks and situations that the missions had to face. This makes us understand that the agents had to have a great degree of mental adaptability in order to manages these strange situations. Another interesting point is the role of France, that here enters overwhelmingly in the picture. France is a great actor, a forgotten one, of the war in Italy. It is, after all, one of the Allies, however, its contribution is often forgotten, with the exception of local histories of areas such as the Aosta Valley or Western Piedmont. In other words, areas where the influence of France was felt directly. And France, it is worth remembering, had its own liaison missions in Italy to coordinate the partisans. However, those missions were not coordinated with the other Allied missions. Third, to conclude, in this case as well we can see that the British officers were initially diffident towards the Italian partisans. Incisor begins, essentially, on the wrong foot, with the conflict between Adam and the local zone commander. However, those problems are quickly overcame and the mission, just like it was for Brietsche, manages to cooperate effectively with the partisans. This situation repeats itself when the French first arrive, when Morton thinks that the Italians are overreacting, but he quickly changes his mind. And he became, just like Brietsche, the guarantor, in a sense, of the good faith of the local partisans. We could maybe say that, with all due limits naturally, his action contributed to the fact that the Aosta Valley was not, in the end, annexed to France.

Thank you all very much for listening to this episode and I will see you in the next one, when we'll recount the tale of a mission we mentioned many times already: the Cherokee, parachuted in North-eastern Piedmont in the Autumn of 1944.