Episode 4 - Cherokee (Part 1)

Hello everybody and welcome to this new episode of “Tales from the Hideout”.

As always, I am Nicola and I will tell for you today the adventures of the “Cherokee” mission, parachuted in Piedmont in the second half of November 1944. The Cherokee mission is different from the previous ones, since it has a very wide coordination aim. Its operative area was made of three different areas, which were essentially covering all the North Piedmont and the Aosta Valley.

The Cherokee mission is way bigger than the Gela mission or of the Incisor mission (which technically was a part of the Cherokee mission as well); even though the original nucleus of the mission was very similar, this will expand quickly, including lots of people and managing the restocks of other partisan bands. For this reason, the mission was directed by an expert Official; for the same reason, the tale of the Cherokee will result a little bit boring, if we compare it with the previous missions.

I think I have said everything about it. Now, let’s enjoy the tale of the Cherokee mission.

During the night of the 17 November 1944, the Cherokee mission was airdropped on the launch field chosen by ‘Monti” (Felice Mautino). The mission had to take place in Piedmont and was made by Major Alastair MacDonald, Tenant Patrick ‘Pat’ Amoore (also known as ‘Amore’ in the documents), Captain Jim Bell, and the telegraphist, Sergeant Tony Birch. ‘Monti’ was vice-commander of the zone and the commander of the ‘Cattaneo’ brigade, belonging to Giustizia e Libertà and operating in the zone between Magnano and Viverone, south of Biella, close to the Viverone lake. The reception of the mission was organized with the help of the ‘Bamon’ mission, which was already operating in the zone. The Cherokee mission was airdropped together with supplies and materials, just because the Cherokee was destined to be an enormous mission with the aim of coordinating other partisan bands and submissions. For this reason, a big amount of materials was launched with its men. The partisans had already prepared a number of carts, which were used for the transportation of these supplies.

Among the four men of the mission, MacDonald have been in the past a Principal, a journalist and a consultant for a British-Argentinian railway company. He was also a veteran from the former SOE operations. He had already experience in Spain, on the Massif Central and in Marsiglia, France. At the end of that mission, he had been assigned to Piedmont because of the complaints made by a local agent, which were about a possible existence of Communist bands. They chose MacDonald because there was a need for a ‘resolute but diplomatic’ Official.

Amoore was the interpreter of the mission, he was a young official who had been part of the Sicilian landing with the Canadian army, before being assigned to the Polish army as an intelligence official, during the Montecassino battle. Finally, there was the presence of somebody who was actually a professional soldier. He voluntarily enlisted in the SOE after the liberation of Rome; he joined the Cherokee because he knew Italian, but at the same time nobody explained to him what he was going to do in this new mission. He literally did a leap of faith when jumping from that airplane.

Bell was assigned to the mission because he was an expert of sabotage, we do not know anything else about him.

Birch, the telegraphist, is known through MacDonald’s description in the final report: he was a ‘young operator, reliable and totally imperturbable’.

The mission and the supplies were brought by the GL’s men at the headquarter of the brigade, east of Zimone, in the same area. The next day, at dawn, some partisans from the Garibaldi brigade (the 75th, led by ‘Mastrilli) went to the headquarter to get their part of restock. Wisely, MacDonald didn’t interfere with the negotiation since he didn’t know anything about the zone; he declared that the Italians could manage the exchange without any problem. Some points, anyway, were unclear, since Mastrilli (Bruno Salza) was the commander of the 2nd Garibaldi brigade, not the 75th (even though both were part of the 5th Garibaldi division).

During the afternoon, the mission was contacted by Mr Macchi, a local industrial man who was the chief of a courier service between Biella’s CLN and the area’s command in Zimone. The mission, later, would have used very frequently its services; MacDonald was always totally satisfied by it. In that moment, Macchi was is Zimone by chance, at least this is what he said. In the final report, MacDonald states that this was a lie, since Macchi (as many people in the neighbourhood) could hear the airplane during the night and wanted to visit the village to know more about it. MacDonald described him in the report as a reliable man, kind and diligent; but his curiosity was beyond the limit.

MacDonald, anyway, started the standard procedure, common to all the missions once they arrived in the operation zone: get information about the other bands and meet all the partisan chiefs of the area. At this point, MacDonald arranged with Macchi a meeting on the 21 November with the mission, Biella’s CLN and the zone command, in order to start the activities. At the same time, he met Monti and the garibaldini’s representants on the 19th. The garibaldini reported that they expected an arrival of men from the Littorio division of the Italian army in the villages of Mongrando, Broglina and Bellengo (north-west of Zimone). These arrivals were threats for the western partisan formation. The partisans asked restocks in order to be prepared in that situation. MacDonald could not promise them the airdrop of new supplies before getting an agreement with the CLN, but at the same time he asked for them the launch of military supplies (munitions, grenades), which was obtained without problems.

On the 21st, since Monti gave them a car, MacDonald and Amoore visited Pettinengo, a village at north of Biella, in order to meet Macchi. MacDonald’s first request to the Italians was to have more information about the partisan brigades of the area, about their weapons and their temperament. He also asked to stop recluting disarmed partisans, since they were not useful to the mission. Unlike Brietsche, MacDonald arrived in Italy after the Alexander proclamation of 13 November 1944; he already knew that the restocks of weapons and materials would have been few from that moment on. In the end, he proposed to arrange a new reaching camp for the airdrops, since the one they had was very far from the partisans’ headquarter and could not have been used in total security.

Two possible areas have been individuated. The first, close to Bocchetta di Sessera, was already covered by about one meter of snow. They gave the order to shovel it. The second was close to Lessona and had a different problem: in Lessona there was a fascist garrison which made the area not safe enough to become a reaching camp. The garibaldini, anyway, had a strong presence in the whole area, in addition this second area could have been very useful in order to give supplies to the 12th and 2nd Garibaldi brigades, which were set nearby. The partisans were ordered to tear down the trees, in order to make the zone more visible from the sky. That deforestation needed an explanation: they decided to tell that it was made because the partisans wanted to give firewood to the population, in order to help them with the cold winter . This was a perfect lie, in addiction it intensified the harmony between the civilians and the partisans. According to MacDonald, the camps were very far from being perfect. They couldn’t do better than that; after reporting the position of the areas to the headquarter, MacDonald and Amoore got back to the base on 23 November.

Right before their return trip, they met another Italian group from the ‘Bamon’ mission, which was operating in the same area. The Bamon was sent there on August 1944 commanded by ‘Carmagnola’, Eugenio Bonvicini, an ex-official from Italian aviation, who joined GL in 1942. MacDonald was contacted by ‘Mercurio’, also known as ‘Mercuzio’, pseudonym for Giorgio Marincola; the misspelling of the pseudonym in the report was due to MacDonald’s poor knowledge of Italian. MacDonald describer Mercurio as a very capable and smart man, with a lot of knowledge in sabotage. Mercurio was followed by Carmagnola himself, who proposed to MacDonald a wide coordination plan between the partisan brigades. Due to the movement of enemy troops from the downside of the valley, this plan had to be momentarily left behind. In the end, MacDonald met also ‘Sciabola’, Lionello Santi; together they decided the roles for Carmagnola and Mercurio. Sciabola proposed to send the Bamon’s telegraphist, ‘Armando’, in Turin; MacDonald, anyway, didn’t find him reliable for this specific task. At the end of the meeting, Sciabola went back to Milan.

At this point, MacDonald decided to move the mission’s headquarter close to the zone command, in Callabiana, north-east, about 10 km from Biella. On the 28th the mission left from Zimone, leaving behind Captain Bell, who was in charge of the management of the reaching camp and of the local contacts. On his side, two former war prisoners from Australia who, since they had been living with the partisans for a while, were able to speak Italian, gaining a very important skill in that situation. It was established that Armando would have reached Bell with the radio kit, becoming his personal operator.

After moving the headquarter, the mission was visited by Major Churchill, aka ‘Peters’, who was not a relative of UK’s Prime Minister; due to this situation of homonymy, Major Churchill’s brother, who was also an SOE agent, pretended to be Winston's relative when he got caught by the Germans in France in 1942. Churchill told to MacDonald lots of information about the local partisans; he got these information for General Cadorna, supreme commander of the CVL, the previous month. The two officials decided that the efficiency of the whole organization was fundamental in order to give strength to the partisans’ action. Milano’s CLN representant should have joined the mission, but this never happened. In the end, Churchill would have been pulled out from the mission in order to go back to the south in December; in that moment, he interrupted his contacts with the Cherokee. Another local official was Captain Burns, who arrived there with his own mission but he couldn’t keep it afloat (we don’t know why). In that moment, Bell was left alone as an interpreter, scout and expert in interrogatories. Other agents from the Bamon mission got in touch from time to time. ‘Lupo’ (Enrico Mario Bambino), ‘Pietro’ e ‘Amici’ (Luigi Biscottini), from that moment on would have been integrated in the Cherokee Mission.

As it is visible, the first week was characterized by lots of preparations. The Cherokee was, indeed, a huge mission with very important coordinational roles on a wide area. This huge amount of people who wanted to speak with MacDonald made him look like a sort of consul, a UK ambassador in Italy, more than a liaison agent. In the operational zone, the situation for the partisans was ‘not too bad’, as MacDonald reports. There were six operational brigades, five garibaldine and one azionista. The garibaldine could each count on about 400 men with weapons, but at the same time they had also their numbers increased by an amount of unarmed partisans. Those five brigades were grouped into two divisions: the 5th and the 12th, each comprehending respectively the 2nd, the 75th and the 50th, the 109th and the 110th. Among these divisions, only the 75th had received an airdrop of essential supplies. The 12th division had some sten and other materials, but just because they received a drop of supplies by mistake, it was destined to another brigade. The rest of the bands’ weaponry has been stolen from the enemy with many methods; none of those band could have been defined as properly armed. The actionist brigade could count on 200 men, mainly from the Aosta Valley, who arrived in the area during the Spring of 1944. Despite the weakness of these formations, they have been left in peace by the enemy for nine months. The partisans formed also a liaison service, with dispatch riders and distribution of supplies; MacDonald judged it as rough but efficient. The main problem was the brigades’ fragmentation on the territory. The 2nd and the 75th Garibaldi brigades were not constantly in contact with the zone commander, nor between them; the 12th division was operating totally by itself. The only communications were made using the dispatch riders. They were particularly efficient, but at the same time they couldn’t operate properly in crisis situations. In addition, the fascist garrison in Valle Mosso (small village near Biella) divided the area in two halves: one at east and one at west. Until that moment, for all of these reasons, the partisans were limited in their actions and had to face many difficulties.

Speaking about the enemy, a small garrison of 200 or 300 fascist troops was in Biella, helped by a small number of Alpini of the Littorio division who were settled in villages nearby. Across the area’s valleys there were small fascist garrisons, while the big ones were in Cattinara, Romagnano and Borgosesia, between Biella and Novara. The Germans were controlling Santhià’s station and, at the same time, they have put about 500 men in Ivrea (many of those troops were Italian), having a wide control on the south-western area of the operational area. Fascists and Germans were particularly busy with keeping their positions safe, for this reason they did not risk with far actions against the partisan bands. The weakness of the bands and the nazifascists was the main cause for this “paused” period, without important actions from the partisans or “rastrellamenti” from the nazi-fascists. In addition, the German commands, which resulted to be well informed about the partisans’ situation, didn’t consider them to be particularly dangerous; for the Germans was ok to keep the partisans in key-positions on the area, minimizing the defensive effort.

The German troops depended on Biella’s factories in order to get new fabric and uniforms; despite the fascist were insisting, they refused to send a rastrellamento in the area, since it would have destroyed the balance they had established in the area. They cared a lot about their serenity: right before the mission’s arrival, the SS tried to establish a cease-fire with the local partisans. MacDonald had many ideas about the reasons why the fascist wanted the rastrellamenti so bad: he imagined that the industrialist on the area, which were supporting them, asked to send away the partisans from the zone.

It was proven that the nazi-fascists had many efficient spies on the area. At the beginning of December, MacDonald was visited by ‘Catone’, who was in company of an hungarian jew named Zolyomy. Churchill had already told to MacDonald that Catone was double faced, since he was collaborating also with the Germans; in that stressful moment, MacDonald completely forgot about that specific detail. Catone wanted to reduce the number of the partisans’ reaching camps. He based his request on the Allies’ guidelines from the Alexander edit. Catone discussed with MacDonald about the situation of the bands in Valsesia, led by Moscatelli, a legendary man from Piedmont’s Resistance. MacDonald tells in the report that he was not convinced about Catone’s figure (probably he wrote this in order to minimize his error in evaluating him). Despite this, the spy could get from MacDonald important information about new reaching camps which had been set up by the partisans.

During that month, the mission was visited also by two important men. The first, named ‘Pedro’, who told them to have been sent by General Cadorna, in order to create a unified command in the area. MacDonald explained to him his doubts, telling him that he believed that the Garibaldini would have never accepted that proposal. At that point, Pedro moved to the Val d’Ossola and didn’t even contact the local command.

The second, Captain Monti, was a GL’s commander who claimed to have a secret contact with Ezio Maria Gray, EIAR’s former director and RSI’s salesman; Gray was wrongly indicated in MacDonald’s report as a Minister of the Socal Republic. He decided to verify the existence of this contact: as a proof of it, he asked Gray to give to him information about the fascist plans about the possible Germans’ retreat beyond the Alps. Days later, Gray reported that the fascists were organizing a coup in the RSI and asked to meet MacDonald, promising that he would have given to him Graziani’s contact, if their meeting would have had positive ending. Together with this message, as a proof of his good intentions, Gray added also that the Germans were planning to scorch the earth around Turin. MacDonald, at this point, tried to arrange the meeting three times, but Gray never managed to show up. We still don’t know if Gray was totally loyal to MacDonald, but this story demonstrated the chaos in which the mission was operating, it testifies the enormous moral and political decline that was present in the RSI at that moment. MacDonald in the final report writes that Gray’s justifications seemed to be plausible and that he found him to be a reliable man.

At the end of December, the mission was visited by ‘Franchi’, pseudonym for Edgardo Sogno. His mission, the ‘Franchi’ indeed, was the one in charge of coordinating all the launches of material in the north of Italy. Nowadays it is still debated whether this was totally true or made-up by Sogno. If we think about the enormous difficulty on coordinating the launches in a small area as the northern-western Piedmont, we can easily imagine how it would have been in the whole north of Italy. Anyway, Franchi reported that there were negotiations about the future of Milano’s CLN, between Bonomi’s Government and the allied high command. As we now know, these negotiations realized into a triple agreement between the Government, the CLN and the allied high command, in December 1944. MacDonald and Franchi reached an agreement about materials’ launches, arranging a liason service between the mission and Milano’s CLN.

In the meantime, the mission received a huge number of allied who had been war’s former prisoners, in addition to those who were already fighting with them or had found asylum in the bands. Everybody was asked to choose: stay and fight or move to Switzerland. Only a minority chose the first option. Three of them were included in the mission, while other four were sent by Bell as supporters. Lots of plans have been written for the evacuation of those who decided to move in Switzerland; the man in charge of those plans was captured by the enemy, for this reason the operations were suspended for a while.

In the second half of December, after weeks of hard work, the mission managed to arrange a constant service of dispatch riders between Milan’s CLN and Turin. The mission was in contact also with Moscatelli and the actionist bands from the Canavese, south-west of Ivrea. Bell got in touch with the valdostan garibaldini, but he couldn’t arrange a service of dispatch riders with them. The lack of supplies made impossible to give a radio kit to each of the new participants; for this reason, the communication between the bands was difficult and occasional. The restocks problem has always been a thorn in the side for MacDonald and his men. Despite they had disillusion about the whole situation in Italy, their expectations were not repaid. As MacDonald reports, the ‘glass could have been considered half full’. After a false start, the supplies finally arrived in December, but the situation was still difficult because of the mutual accuses of robbery made by azionisti and garibaldini. The mission couldn’t be anywhere at the same time, for this reason it never managed to investigate on this accuses; the mission could only remember to the partisan commanders that stealing the allies’ supplies was a crime and it would have compromised the partisans’ reputation before the commanders. Moreover, despite the local command agreed on giving them transports in order to bring a part of those supplies outside the Biella area, when the supplies arrived it resulted to be very hard to actually hand over those restocks. The partisans, without any doubt, were particularly greedy for weapons and food: once they got their hands on those supplies, was very hard for them to give it away. On that situation, the cherry on top was the immediate interruption of supplies’ airdrops after the first ones, without any further explanation. For this reason, the mission was forced to call back many of the supplies already divided among the brigades, in order to redistribute it and give some of them to other brigades which were left behind. This created a lot of confusion and bad blood.

When the partisans were, finally, partially armed, they could start to attack the enemy. The majority of those attacks were in reduced scale: they did just some attacks in order to get food and fuel.The 75th Garibaldi attacked the Alpini from the Littorio, sending them away from their positions. The Alpini were few, their moral was very low and many of them deserted or ran away. Thanks to this action, the road between Biella and Ivrea became controlled by the partisans. The Garibaldini at that point established a new headquarter for the brigade, in Torrazzo, close to the road, in order to be steadily in contact with the close 76th Garibaldi brigade. During this period, this was the only big action did by the partisans. This was not because they lacked in enthusiasm, but only because the mission thought it was necessary to train the partisans before attacking the enemy. In addition, during a raid against the storages, a partisan who was moving away from the zone the evacuation plans (in case of rastrellamento) got caught by the enemy. Despite MacDonald’s objections, the local command refused to change the plans. MacDonald does not explain why this happened, it would be very interesting to know the partisans’ version of this story. A good theory is that, considered the territory’s nature, these plans were written based on the geography of the area rather than on the partisans’ will: they couldn’t have been changed even if they wanted to. At the end of December, they had more weapons and were well trained: for this reason, they managed to realise important operations. The railway bridge in Ivrea was bombed on Christmas Eve by the actionists, blocking the railway traffic between Turin and Aosta Valley. On Christmas day, the 75th Garibaldi, which was famous for an outstanding diligence, attacked the fascist garrison in Cigliano, south of Ivrea, destroying it completely and stealing from it a great amount of supplies, weapons and munitions. They only lost a van, which had a malfunction on the road. The partisans also tried to bomb another railway bridge between Salussola and Biella, but the bombs resulted to be too weak and the damage had been repaired shortly.

On the 26th, they received news about a huge rastrellamento planned by the enemy, as a response to the actions did by the partisans in the previous weeks. The rastrellamento would have taken place in the first week of January. The mission met the local command in order to decide the countermeasures, but in the end they did decide anything. The command wanted to retire the forces towards west, in the Canavese and “pianurizzare” the 2nd Garibaldi brigade and the 12th division, leaving behind small groups in order to show to the enemy that they were still present in the area. MacDonald didn’t agree on such a huge retirement from the area, without even trying to resist to the enemies’ attacks. In addition, such a huge retirement would have made impossible to transport the big amount of materials they had; a consequence would have been the loss of munitions and explosives. MacDonald underlined that, also, the heavy snow fallen on those day would have influenced and weakened the enemy’s advance. Once again, the situation created some controversies between partisans’ point of view and mission’s position. It is interesting to notice that, once again, the mission asked the partisans to keep on fighting openly with the enemy, underestimating the strenght of the nazifascists and overestimating the partisans’ one. As far as we can talk about it, the partisan plan seemed to be more reasonable, if we take into consideration the war’s situation. This is in conflict with all those generalized narrations, which always put the partisans in a position of resistance, while the missions are seen as conservationists.

In the end, MacDonald, against his will, had to accept the zone command’s plan; he admitted that an alternative strategy could not have been planned in such a small time, taking into account also the communication problems between the brigades. The enemy started his attack starting from the south-west, near Ivrea; after some skirmishes, the 75th Garibaldi and the GL brigade left behind the enemy, following the retirement plan. Also the 76th Garibaldi, which didn’t have enough munitions, retired after the attack of Georgian troops coming from Bollengo and Donato, close to Ivrea. The local command was dispersed in the area and the mission moved to Colma, north of Biella, waiting for further developments. After few days, they had the feeling that the Germans and the fascists were content about the results obtained: they looked like they didn’t want to go beyond the Alps. The zone command got together again in Callabiana, close to Colma. Both the command and MacDonald were sure that the nazi-fascists would have waited for a week before attacking again. MacDonald, who wanted still to resist, managed to better organize the brigades, in order to grow their cohesion and solidity. He wanted also to be coordinated with Moscatelli, in order to make him attack the enemy’s formation on the side, alleviating the pressure on the partisans’ shoulders. The local command agreed on those ideas; anyway, there was no way on convincing them that the area at north-east of Biella could have been successfully protected. MacDonald believed that they were particularly scared by the huge number of troops of the enemy, which were settling in that same area, even though this information resulted to be, much later, imprecise and exaggerated. Despite this, they decided to put mines on the roads, using the explosive they would have used for the sabotage operations.

MacDonald found, surprisingly, many allies when he was insisting on staying and fight the enemy in the local command; he believed that the lower ranks of the command, when compared to the real command, had gumption. Mr Macchi had ferocious critiques against the local command’s plan, many important personalities of Biella agreed with him. He thought that the support that all of them gave to the partisans until that moment had already compromised their situation; he asked to the partisans to guarantee them a sort of security against any nazi-fascist attack. In the end, after receiving pressures, the zone command agreed on attacking three local garrisons: in Adorno, in Cossato and in Valle Mosso. The idea was to hinder the enemy’s plans, opening a gap on their formations in order to made possible to the partisans to run away in case of retirement; this would have perked up the partisans’ mood, that was very bad in that moment. New information arrived, about a movement of the enemy’s troops; for this reason, the zone command decided to leave and reach Bornasco. The mission had to follow them, since without the partisans it was worthless for them to stay in that area. Amoore was sent to the 75th Garibaldi, in order to coordinate the connection with Moscatelli, who was resisting in Lozzolo, east of Biella, and help him against the enemy. On January 14th, MacDonald managed to get in touch with Bell, who was isolated after the first attacks that month. The day after, the 75th Garibaldi attacked the enemy, destroying a garrison of field officers who got lost close to Cerrione. This caused a reprisal from the Germans. A group of Wafer SS occupied Cerriose, while other groups were sent towards Zimone. The partisans had to leave their positions, risking to get caught. Of three reaching camps, only one was left in the partisans’ hand. It became crucial to localize a new camp: for that reason, MacDonald and Bell planned a trip to Azeglio on the 17th, close to Lake Viverone. In order to communicate to the zone command how big was its discontent, the mission decided to give the camp’s management not to the command, but to the 76th Garibaldi, a brigade which was not operating in the Biella area. MacDonald reported that this would have calmed the garibaldini, since they did not take part into the allocation of the supplies until that moment and started to feel mocked.

On January 17th, the situation was easily flowing. Bell didn’t suggest to meet MacDonald in Magnano and then proceed towards Azeglio, since there was a strong presence of the enemy in that area. Anyway, the local command during the night retired three garrisons in Magnano; for that reason, MacDonald thought that the situation was reasonably safe, since the Germans left Zimone. The Major arrived at midday in the village, with Caporal Jones, a former war prisoner from Australia. At the village’s entrance, they met by chance Armando and ‘Gabori’. The two were trying to go to Biella, and MacDonald gave them some orders to give to Lupo and Carmagnola. In the village, the only partisans left were few garibaldini from the second brigade, about twelve people. They confirmed that everything was under control. MacDonald met them while they were eating in a local restaurant, without any sentinel. The Major pur a sentinel outside the restaurant and joined them. After one hour they got the notice that the Germans were approaching the village of Piverone. MacDonald was mildly worried but convinced that he could escape if necessary; he told Jones to look at the situation from a close ridge. After ten minutes they heard some screams: it was the sign that the Germans were already in the village. From that moment on, the situation was in chaos. The group tried to attack, but the Germans reacted shooting them; Armando got injured. Gabori somehow managed to go across the enemy’s lines and ran away. MacDonald, after shooting for a while, didn’t want to leave Armando, who was injured and probably would have been killed by the Germans; for that reason MacDonald surrendered to the Germans and was taken as a prisoner. Armando bled to death a bit later, while the Major was brought to the SS Headquarter in order to be interrogated.

It’s with this final cliffhanger that we finish today’s tale of the Cherokee mission. As I have said before, it’s a Mission full of people, it looks a lot like an embassy if we consider the amount of people encountered by MacDonald. I don’t want to speak further about the general considerations on the mission, I don’t want to spoil things and ruin the suspense.

I’ll wait for you next week, to go on with the adventures of the Cherokee mission!