Episode 7 - Envelope Blue

Welcome everybody to the new episode of “Racconti dal nascondiglio”. I, as always, am Nicola and today’s mission is the “Envelope Blue” made by Major (in that moment, Captain) Davies, who operated on the Appennino Emiliano from July 1944 until the end of the war. A mission which spent a very long time with the partisans, almost 10 months. It was, indeed, one of the first missions sent in Italy by the SOE; Davies’s report dated November 1944, about the situation in Italy, was specifically written with the intent of transforming it into a training tool for the next generation of agents. It is clear, then, that the mission found itself operating “off the cuff”, at least in the first part of the mission. The mission established many of the habits of the SOE in Italy. The Envelope Blue mission was born as a reinforcement mission. On the area, indeed, there was already Major Johnston, who was planning a huge operation with the local partisans. Johnston is one of the most famous names in Italy (among those of the other liaison officers), since that operation resulted to be a total failure. 

Today’s story is long, its narrative is quite fragmented and full of recriminations. It’s not easy to reconstruct it, but I hope you will enjoy my attempt!

The Envelope Blue mission was parachuted on July 27th 1944 in Frassinoro, close to Modena. It was made of 6 people. The head of the mission, Major Jim Davies, had recently turned 30 years old. He grew up in Switzerland, was an excellent skier. He got a degree in Oxford, in sylviculture, for that reason he immediately started to work with the Bombay Burmah Trading Company, who put him as a supervisor in the teak forests (in the north-western regions of Myanmar, which were in that moment known as “Burma” and under British control). Before he came to Italy, he was famous for two thing in particular: he is known for transporting 30 elephants on a raft, on a river, within 3 days, and also because he served Lieutenant Colonel Williams, “elephant Bill”. Williams conducted many operations against the Japanese forces on the border between India and Myanmar. Davies had to go back to the United Kingdom because of a severe malaria and dysentery. In the UK he first became the head of a platoon made of diggers, then he was enrolled in the SOE. He was enrolled after having a conversation in a train, by chance, with an officer of that service. Considered his passed records, they couldn’t let him go. In October 1943 he was airdropped in Greece, where he collaborated with communist bands from the ELAS. After coming back from that mission he was assigned to Italy. He was with Captain Ernest Wilcockson, Captain Charles Holland, Captain Lloyd-Roberts and two telegraphists: Corporal Frank Haynurst (who was only 20 years old) and Charles “Charlie” Barratt. Wilcockson, who was part of the Royal Artillery, had been a liaison officer for the agents sent to Crete. Then, he became an instructor of weapons and explosives in Monopoli’s school. He was expected to keep on working as an instructor, even though this time was for the partisans. Holland, who was a signal officer, had already worked with Davies in Greece; he previously worked also in Spain, where the SOE wanted him to create some radio networks, which were kept inactive, but ready to use in case of German’s occupation. Lloyd was a medical officer, we do not know much about him. Unfortunately, we know just the names of the two telegraphists.

The group had been put together all of a sudden. To be precise, it was formed just few days before the beginning of the mission. Wilcockson, for example, had been called with rather a day in advance, risking of being sent to Italy without even the vaccinations. The reason for this hurry was because of the situation in the area.

Major Vivian Johnston was waiting for them; he needs, at this point, a short introduction. Johnston had been quite a pioneer among the SOE agents sent in Italy, the first ever in the Appennini. He was airdropped in the second part of June on Mount Albano , in Tuscany, with his radio operator, Sergeant Edward Everitt, in order to join Domenico Azzari, an Italian agent who was the only member of the “Rutland” mission. The drop resulted to be a disaster, since the majority of the equipment got lost. The two men, despite being help by local shepherds, weren’t able to move the Rebecca/Eureka set they had, for that reason they decided to destroy it. Thing didn’t go better. The ground situation was chaotic and confused. Johnston expected to have trained partisans, already organized and led by somebody: this didn’t happen. After few frustrating weeks, Johnston passed the Appennino and went down to the Secchia valley, south of Modena. Here, the partisan war was on another level. From June 18th the partisans had started the liberation of Montefiorino, establishing the, probably, most famous partisan Republic, together with Ossola. Johnston’s arrival galvanized the partisans: that was a sign of trust from the Allied, plus his presence regularized the airdrop of supplies and restocks. By the end of July, the drops were almost daily. Montefiorino’s partisans became part of a huge plan made by the Allies who, after many setbacks, have started again the advance. It was interrupted after the liberation of Rome; at the same time, they were still nurturing the hope of being able to reach the Alps by the end of that summer.

The idea was to airdrop in the area, behind the enemies’ lines, a battalion from nembo’s division (of the reconstructed Italian Army) which was expected to attack the Germans together with the partisans. That would have created a distraction while the fifth American army would have assaulted the Arno river. Despite being too daring, the plan could count on some small possibilities of victory; unfortunately, it got stuck before being airdropped. While in Montefiorino people were hard working, in the Allied headquarter there was a discussion ongoing: they were discussing about the possibility of sending men from the nembo division as assistants to the landings in Provence. Alexander got furious when he heard about this idea, and he decided to go back to his plan. In the following days, 38 out of the 48 flights in charge of delivering supplies in Italy were going to Modena and La Spezia, where Johnston was operating. This reinforced the idea that the operation was about to happen. Many weapons were delivered to the nembo: a dozen of mortars, four anti-tank machine guns and 250 assault rifles. Among these airdrops, the Envelope Blue mission arrived, together with an Italian officer and other six radio operators. Their drop was not better than Johnston’s one. Lloyd hit a building and wounded a leg. Wilcockson (who was dropped by a height two times higher than the recommended one) got lost and, after many hours, found himself in Frassinoro: he went to a local tavern. He didn’t speak a word of Italian, so he tried to explain with gestures his situation to the locals. After a couple of hours, probably called by one of the patrons, an interpreter arrived (an Italian who spoke a perfect English), Alfredo Giacomo Venturi. He was known as “Jock” since he was born in Scotland, in Glasgow, where his parents ran a fish and chips shop. “Jock” willingly helped Wilcockson, so he started to collaborate with the SOE in Italy until the end of the war.

The Envelope mission was just arrived when, on July 30th, the Germans sent a huge “rastrellamento” from the Göering division. The activities and the airdrops of the partisans have been too heavy to be unseen. About 20000 men were sent by the enemy for that operation; they used flamethrowers, artillery, mortars and armoured cars. The Montefiorino battle was one of the biggest among the battles that made the story of the Resistance. Anyway, it couldn’t have been won by the partisans. “One will see in rapid succession examples of courage and cowardice, of generosity and cruelty, of dishonesty and integrity [...], there emerged the feeling that the Italian partisan is competing under conditions of stress in a creditable matter”, wrote Lloyd. Moreover, Lloyd had an important role also on deny the gossip about the Germans preparing a bacteriological attack using the typhus fever.

After some ferocious conflicts, the partisan commander Armando (Mario Ricci, the one who liberated Montefiorino) gave order of retirement. At this point, the partisan forces collapsed. Davies, in his report writes that this was due to “inexperience, poor leadership, lack of intelligence and discipline”. Davies thought that the partisans had to disperse themselves and divide into smaller groups (each with a commander), but in the end they left behind all their supplies and ran away in a messy way (Davies underlines that Giuseppe Barbolini’s band was the only exception, since they remained together and managed to survive). The defeat was followed by a slaughter, one of the worse in the story of the partisan war. People were tortured, executed, raped, deported, while many villages were set on fire. That was the idea of “order” of the nazi-fascists.

As for the Grappa disaster, the fall of Montefiorino brought with it many consequences, especially those regarding the mutual accusations. Many of these accusations were focused on Johnston, an inexpert official who was in charge of heavy responsibilities. Davies was way more expert than him, and valued that the decision of airdropping the nembo had been too hurried, since it wasn’t distracting enough for helping the Tuscanian front. In addition, it was based on the assumption that the partisans were able to hold their position against the Germans; Davies thought that this idea was totally without any foundation. Mario Nardi, known as commander Armando, used to have a nice opinion about Johnston in the past, but in that moment he thought that the official didn’t have the faintest idea about guerrilla principles. Despite being inexpert, Johnston was at least conscious about the whole situation. On his messages to the base, he described the situation as a compromised one, without hiding the fact that the partisans had a huge lack of discipline and organization. He said that also because the communists used to kept away the former officers of the Italian army. Johnston describes this reaction as understandable (if not for 20 years of fascism), but it obliged many people to cover command positions without being able to do that. As a whole, Johnston and the partisans can be looked at as victims of easy enthusiasm. More that on the nembo’s arrival and on the Italians’ abilities to keep up with the Germans, their actions were based on the illusion that the war in Italy would have been ended soon. For this reason, they thought that the Allies would have arrived until the Alps, but they got stuck on the Gothic line. Those enthusiasms were not Johnston’s nor partisans’ responsibilities, but depended on the Allied commanders. Those commanders created chaos moving troops in Provence, keeping Alexander and letting him go following the Germans. They confirmed the illusions of the partisans and the mission, keeping on going with the airdrops; this reinforced the idea that the nembo’s operation was actually reality, and that the war was about to end. 

After Montefiorino’s defeat, the project of airdropping the nembo was left behind. The command gave order to Johnston to go to visit Major Lett, who was in Zeri (over Liguria, Emilia and Tuscany). Lett used to be a pow who got caught in Torbuk, Libya. After the 8th of September, he ran away from his imprisonment camp, joining the local partisans. After getting in touch with the SOE in Switzerland, he had been nominated Liaison Officer for that area. He had been one of the first agents there, without even being airdropped. Returning to the Envelope mission, Davies decided to divide his men into four groups. The radio kits were buried, just one was given to Johnston. During the night, the groups left the area, passing through the enemy’s lines. After marching for five days, Davies met by chance two partisans, who told him that the Germans were doing a “rastrellamento” in the Zeri area. Davies decided to go back; on his way back he met Wilcockson and Johnston at Mount Tondo. He established a camp with a local band in Comano (between La Spezia and Parma), where he met Holland and his radio operators. Clearly the nazi-fascists movements had, unintentionally, concentrated the men in the same area. Despite the huge risk, they decided that somebody had necessarily to go back and get one of the buried radio kits, in order to get in touch with the commands. Holland and Corporal Barratt were sent with this intent, getting four out of the six radio kits. The locals, despite the danger, few hours after the departure of the mission have moved the kits to a safer place (since they knew the area way better than the agents). Holland, with the help from Hayhurst, managed to get in touch with the commands on August 20th, starting the “Toffee” mission. He moved towards Parma, where he joined a brigade from Giustizia e Libertà, in the city of Tizzano. Davies moved towards Parma, while Wilcockson formed the “Silentia” close to Modena. Johnston stayed in Mount Tondo, where he helped Captain Tony Oldham (another former pow) to create his own mission. All of these fragmented missions, between Modena, Parma and La Spezia, had to face a very difficult operation on reconstructing their contacts, putting together the ruins of the partisan movement, after ferocious rastrellamenti by the enemy. As Davies wrote, despite their requests of supplies were never listened, the Resistance was getting in forces, the partisans were improving their organization. 

By the end of August, the men from GL sent back an attack from the enemy to three armoured cars and two trucks, which belonged to motorized troops which were trying to re-open the traffic in Parma’s valley. The mission got the order to contact Parma’s CLN; for this reason Davies, with Holland and Hayhurst, moved the co-mission close to Parma, contacting the local bands by the beginning of September. The enemy has still a strong presence in the area, with a strong rear guard on the Gothic Line; for the enemy was essential to keep away the partisans, which could have interrupted the delivery of supplies from the headquarter. Many garrisons were placed in the biggest villages between Parma and La Spezia, while numerous patrols were regularly sent in exploration. Davies then reports that none of these tasks was given to the Brigata Nera, since the Germans considered them to be unreliable and scared by the partisans. The German soldiers had a high moral and they rarely deserted, also when belonging to non-German units, since the consequences of desertions would have been very harsh. A more alarmingly fact is that the enemy seemed to be very well informed about the partisan’s moves and the dimensions of the movement. Davies told, anyway, that it was evident that the partisans were, for the enemy, “bugbears” and source of concerns, since they were hiding in remote areas in the Appennini and were occupying the communications between the mounts.

Speaking about the partisans, Parma’s CLN gave the order of forming brigades for the communists, the demo christians and the actionists. Davies doesn’t write much here, he omits the names of the commanders; for this reason, is very difficult to understand which band he is talking about. A single command was organized, the GAP and the SAP were both responding to a single commander, who was a CLN member as well. The first single command was in Bosco di Corniglio, but it resulted to be too big and static: for this reason, this became an easy target for the Germans. By the half of September, a patrol from Brigata Nera went many times to Beduzzo, north-east from Bosco. The CU organized an attack against this patrol, but this left the northern side without any protection. The Germans, indeed, decided to send the fascists on the front line in order to attract the partisans. On the morning of October 17th (as it is written in the report, but this is clearly a mistake), thanks to a heavy storm, the Germans attacked the CU, killing three men including the commander (Pablo, Giacomo Crollanza); the most serious thing is that they collected also their archive. The mission was very close but they managed to run away: they could hear the shots, for this reason the agents decided that it was time to run off. 

The new CU managed to be reconstructed after this attack, and it was planned to be smaller and more agile: the lesson was already learnt. “Arta” was named commander, who was the garibaldino Giacomo Ferrari (who will become Minister of the Transports with De Gasperi’s government). Chief of Major State was “Nardo”, Leonardo Tarantini, a former official. A demo christian was named Commissioner, Professor Prussia, Achille Pellizzari, who was a teacher at Genova’s University. Two azionisti were nominated Vice Commander and Vice Commissioner. In order to avoid any discussion about the drops of supplies, the mission put the CU in charge of the distribution. By the beginning of the Autumn the mission got six operation brigades, the partisans were about 3300 men. The Garibaldine brigades were three (the 47th, the 12th, the 31st) with about 1800 men, the demo christians brigades (1st and 2nd Julia) had 1000 men and the 1st GL brigade had 500 men. This number was enlarged by the partisans who were still training: the final amount estimated by Davies was of about 5500 men. They were equipped with just light weapons. Davies told to the command that another band was operating in the area, commanded by Beretta, who was an anti-communist and not controlled by the CU.

All of these men needed food, that wasn’t a secondary problem. It was made more difficult not only by the destruction of the villages made by the nazi-fascists, but also because winter was arriving. The partisans invented a plan of food requisition, of course paid, which got the approval of the mission. Davies told the command that the liaison officers had to be provided of money, in order to make them able to pay the farmers for the requisitions. Davies was also very satisfied with the courthouse put together by the CU, which was useful for give a trial to fascists, spies or outlaw partisans. The agents were always hungry, they used to eat potatoes most of the time. One day Davies was on recognition with another partisans, when they heard a noise similar to the one made by machine guns. The two went closer and they discovered some men which were distilling grappa using a still on wheels. The men cheered them saying “salve magistero!” and giving them a hot glass of grappa. Davies on his report wrote that the hot grappa was totally different than the cold one.

Between the end of September and the beginning of October the partisan activities started again, more regularly. They did few attacks on the road between Parma and La Spezia, they assaulted the garrisons in Lesignano and Langhirano (killing about 50 German men). The partisans advanced also towards the plain, collecting food, horses, cars and weapons. The enemies tried to re-open streets that connected Vetto with Parma and Reggio Emilia; this caused the death of 150 men on heavy battles. The partisans assaulted also the railway between Borgo Val di Taro and Fornovo. From the second half of October, the enemy’s operations intensified, with huge patrols with good weapons sent in recognition on the area. It was in these days that the first CU was destroyed. The munitions of the partisans fell short, so they ran away. Despite this, in order to tell to the enemy that they were still there, the partisans started as well to send patrols on recognition. Davies writes that this was a good idea, also because it trained the men. Despite the lack of supplies and airdrops, the mood got better.

On October 26th Davies went south, using the road between Parma and La Spezia; he wanted to intensify the attacks on that route, cutting the enemy’s communications. After few days, he got a reprimand from the South command: they wanted more information about the partisans, in order to better distribute the supplies they received via airdrops. On the night of November 7th, Davies crossed the border on Mount Corchia, going back to the liberated part of Italy. Holland stayed behind, as a head of the Toffee mission, while Lieutenant Leng would have been parachuted in order to help him with his tasks. 

This is the end of the mission, probably a little bit scarce and without a proper climax. This was the story of Davies’s first mission in Italy.